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INTRODUCTION: KOLMOGOROV' S AXIOMS AND EPISTEMIC PROBABILITY 
The publication of Kolmogorov's Foundations of the Theory of 
Probability in 1933 was a decisive event in the development of 
probability theory as a mathematical discipline. Kolmogorov's six 
axioms identified probability as a special case of the measure and 
integration theory developed by Lebesgue, and so the powerful 
machinery of that theory could be used to establish probabilistic 
results rigorously and in great generality. However, Kolmogorov 
left open the question of how to interpret the mathematical enti.ties 
. 
G, f and P to which his axioms referred (except for finite G, where 
~e seemed to regard tqe elements of Gas ~escriptions of the possible 
outcomes of some repeatable experiment, and P(A) the proportion of 
times that the outcomes in A had occurred in some finite sequence of 
repetitions of the experiment). In addition, Kolmogorov acknowledged 
that some elements of his axiomatization--in particular, the conti-
nuity axiom, Axiom VI--introduced "arbitrary limitations", not 
required by the nature of whatever it is that the mathematical entities 
actually represent. 
As Ian Hacking has argued in his book The Emergence of Probability, 
two different notions of the nature of probability have coexisted, 
sometimes uneasily, since mathematicians first turned their attention 
to probabilistic problems. Epistemic probability describes degree 
of belief, while aleatory probability describes an attribute of 
objects: the propensity of what Kolmogorov (1956) refers to as 
"observable random phenomena" to achieve stable relative frequencies 
under extended series of independent repetitions. 
Most workers who have adopted the Kolmogorov axiomatization, 
including Kolmogorov himself, have emphasized the aleatory interpre-
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tation of probability. However, there seems to be an increasing 
recognition hy statisticians that epistemic interpretations are also 
useful, if not necessary, for two purposes that are fundamental to 
inference: stating predictions about future observables, in such a 
way that the predictions are not conditional on unobservable "states 
of the world"; and a·ssigning probabilities to propositions about such 
unobservable "states of the world". Indeed, Bayesian statistical 
inference consists precisely in the utilization of epistemic probab-
ility for these tw.o purposes. 
Are Kolmogorov's axioms warranted if probability is interpreted 
epistemically-that is, as a measure of degree of belief? Many 
authors have considered this question, taking many different 
approaches to the problem of defining "degree of belief." Virtually 
all of the elements of KollDogorov's axiomatization have been 
challenged somewhere in this literature. Some authors--in particular 
Koopman (.1940), Good (19.50) and Smith (1961)--have argued for qual-
itative or set-valued measures for belief. Others-for example, 
de Finetti (1974). and de Jouvenal (1967)---haye accepted a reat-
.. 
valued measure, but have denied the appropria~~ness of n (.that ·is, 
an exhaustive list of nondecomposable propositions); while others 
have granted n, but have challenged the requirement that F should be 
a a-field or even a field (see, for example, Fine U9.73}}. As far 
as Pis conce.xned, the epistemic justification for its additivity 
has heen questioned, for example by Shafer (1976}, whose theory of 
evidence has heen 10uch admired recently by some workers in artificial 
intelligence expert systems. Others, especially de Finetti (1974) 
and Savage (1954), have justified finite additivity, hut rejected the 
necessity of countable additivity. Finally, many authors, including 
Jeffreys (19.61} and Renyi (.1956) and, .more recently, Reggazini (.1983), 
Holzer (1985} and Armstrong and Sudderth. (1985), have found Kolmo-
gorov' s normalization requirement that P($2l should eq_ual 1 to he too 
restrictive to permit all reasonable comparisons of uncertainty. 
I will not attempt to summarize all this literature in this talk. 
Rather, I will focus on one approach to epistemic probahility and its 
bearing on a question of fundamental importance, the logical validity 
of the Law of Total Probability. A major theme will be the 
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interplay between the interpretation of probability and its appro-
priate mathematization. 
COHERENCE AND COUNTABLE ADDITIVITY 
Around the same time that Kolmogorov formulated his axioms for 
probability theory, de Finetti was developing a quite different 
approach to the subject. De Finetti was concerned with the problem 
of how to act in the face of uncertainty. He argued that .1 t was 
necessary for an individual to measure his uncertainty about the 
truth of a proposition in terms of his propensity to act as though 
the proposition were true, and so he proposed a definition of prob-
ability in terms of a decision with simple economic consequences. 
Specifically, the probability of a proposition is the price at which 
the assessor is neutral between buying and selling a ticket that is 
worth $1 if the proposition is true and is otherwise worthless. 
With this definition, de Finetti was able to give a precise mean-
ing to consistent reasoning about uncertainty. Suppose an individual 
measures his uncertainty about a set of propositions, so that he has, 
.according to de Finetti's definition, determined the price·of a 
corresponding set of tickets. Could someone .. transact with the 
assessor to buy or sell some of these tickets, at the assessor's 
prices, in such a way that the assessor must pay out more than he 
receives, no matter which of the propositions tum out to be true and 
which to be false? If so, the set of assessments is incoherent: the 
possibility of sure loss concretizes the inconsistent reasoning 
underlying the assessments. A set of assessments that cannot result 
in sure loss is called coherent. 
To make the definition of coherence operational, de Finetti insisted 
that the transactions described there be limited to a finite number 
of sales or purchases. It is possible to make an infinite number of 
probability assessments with the stroke of a pen, but there is no 
physically realizable way to exchange more than a finite number of 
dollars. 
De Finetti proved that a set of probability assessments·on some 
collection of subsets of a set n is coherent if and only if it is 
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consistent with a finitely additive probability measure 4efined on 
all subsets of a. Thus, de Finetti rejected Kolmogorov's Axiom VI, 
which requires probability measures to be countably additive. In 
his writings, he has given a number of examples of epistemically 
justifiable noncountably additive probability distributions, including 
the uniform distribution on the integers (see also Hill (1980) and 
Scozzafava (1981), which presents an example in the context of the 
first digit problem). 
THE LAW OF TOTAL PROBABILITY 
The Law of Total Probability plays a fundamental role in probability 
assessment. To determine the probability of a proposition A, an 
assessor often finds it convenient to "extend the conversation" (in 
Dennis Lindley's phrase) to include a set n of mutually excl1;15ive, 
exhaustive propositions; then to evaluate a probability distribution 
µ over n and, for each h inn, the conditional probability P(Alh); 
and finally to assess t~e probability for A by the formula 
(1) P(A) = fP(Alh)dµ(h). 
In Foundations of Probability Theory, Kolmogorov defined P(Ajh), 
when h has positive probability, as the ratio of the two unconditional 
probabilities P(Ah) and P(h), so that (1) is true by definition (and 
the additivity of P) in this case. However, since he offered no 
interpretation of conditional probability that could be used to 
produce a direct assessment for P(Afh), there is no way ~o determine 
P(Ajh) except in terms of unconditional probability assessments, and 
so the assessment strategy described above is meaningless. In case 
Il is uncountable, Kolgomorov defined the random variable P(AI•) in 
terms of a Radon-Nikodym derivative, again in such a way as to make 
(1) true by_definition. But P(AI•) is not even defined pointwise on 
the set of elements of n that have probability zero, so the assess-
ment strategy is impossible to implement in this case as well. 
In contrast to the Kolmogorov approach, de Finetti directly qefined 
conditional probability. For two propositions A and B, the condi-
tional probability P(AjB) is the price at which the assessor is 
neutral between buying and selling a ticket that is worth $1 if A 
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and Bare both true, worth nothing if Bis true and A is false and 
for which the purchase price is refunded if it turns out that Bis 
false. With this definition, de Finetti proved that unconditional 
assessments P(AB} and P{~) and conditional assessment P(AIB) were 
coherent if and only if P(AB) equalled the product of P(B) and_ P(AIB} 
(so that the relation between conditional and unconditional probab-
ility that Kolmogorov introduced by definition for P{B.) > 0 can be 
obtained as a consequence of de Finetti's coherence requirement). 
If n is a finite partition, and the probabilities P(A) and 
{P(Alh) }h in n are assessed, coherence requires that equatio~ (1) 
must hold. However, if n is infinite, de Finetti argued that (1) 
need not hold, because of the limitation to a finite number of cash 
transactions in the definition of coherence. lbus, an assessor 
could coherently violate the Law of Total Probability. 
Now consider the validity of the Law of Total Probability, not for 
a particular proposition A, but for the entire distribution P. That 
is, suppose f and Gare algebras of subsets of n, with f contained 
in G, and n a G-measurable partition of n. Suppose further that P 
is~ probability measur~·on (n,G) with n-marginal ~, ·and for each h 
inn, P(,jh} is a probability measure on (O,f) with support in h. 
Then 
(.a) P is II-disintegrable with disintegration {PC• jh)} if equation 
(1) holds for all A inf. 
(b) P is conglomerable with respect to {P(. • jh)} if for all A in f 
(2) 
If (.2) fails for same A in F, then P is nonconglome rable. (Clearly, 
if Pis nonconglomerable, it cannot be disintegrable.) 
Even the Kolmogorov theory admits situations in which the Law of 
Total Probability fails to hold for all events in an algebra f: that 
is, as is well-known, there are examples of countably additive dis-
tributions P that are not disintegrable with respect to uncountable 
partitions (see Blackwell and Dubins (1975)). The situation is worse 
with respect to noncountably additive distributions. It is easy to 
find examples, like the following, of noncountably additive distri-
butions. that are nonconglomerahle with respect to countable partitions, 
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which cannot happen if Pis cowitably additive. 
Example: Suppose P1 and P2 are probability measures on the non-
negative integers: P1 is countably additive, supported by the even 
integers, and gives each even integer positive probability; P2 is a 
diffuse distribution (that is, P2{i} = 0 for each integer i) supported 
by the odd integers. Let P = (P1+P2)/2, and define the partition 
with elements hi= {2i,2i+l} for i = 0,1 ••• To satisfy the Law of 
Total Probability for the singleton {2i}, P( {2iJ°lhi) must equal 1 
for each i • With this assessment, . the Law then fails for any set 
containing a subset of the odd integers with positive P2-probability. 
In fact, nonconglomerability with respect to countable partitions 
characterizes noncountable additivity. De Finetti (1974) conjectured 
and Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane (1984) and Hill and Lane (1985) 
proved that for any noncountably additive probability measure P, 
there must be a countable partition n, such that Pis nonconglomerable 
with respect to {P(•lh)}h in Il' when conditional probability measures 
are defined with respect to all nonempty measurable sets. This con-
nection between noncountable additivity and nonconglomerability has 
inc1ined several statisticians who subscribe to de Finetti's foun-
dational framework, and so accord an inferential role to noncountably 
additive distributions, to accept nonconglomerable assessments as a 
basis for inference as well (for discussion and examples, see de 
Finetti (1972), Hill (1980), Scozzafava (1984) and Kadane, Schervish 
and Seidenfeld (1986)). The position is challenged in the next two 
sections. 
PROSPECTIVE PROBABILITIES 
De Finetti's result that distributions that are nonconglomerable 
with respect to infinite partitions are coherent is mathematically 
unarguable. The question is whether the way in which he defined 
conditional probability corresponds to any inferential problem of 
interest. That is, do the rules for the economic transactions 
incorporated in that definition adequately translate the epistemic 
role that conditional probability plays in inference? 
It is a truism to say that all epistemic probabilities are condi-
tional, on everything that the assessor believes to be true (or that 
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he chooses to act as though he believes to be true). The conditional 
probabilities that figure in de Finetti's definition have a different 
character. They are evaluated as though the evaluator believes that 
the conditioning proposition is true, even though he explicitly 
asserts, through his unconditional probab~lity assessments, that this 
is not the case. 
What is the point of evaluating such quantities? Since subjective 
probability assessment is never easy, it makes no sense to evaluate 
probabilities that do not figure in particular inferential problems, 
and even if they are evaluated, it seems pointless to test whether 
they are consistent with evaluations that do have an inferential role 
to play. I know only two kinds of situations in which it is infer-
entially advantageous to evaluate a probability conditionally on a 
proposition whose truth the evaluator is unwilling to assume. The 
first, discussed in this section, has to do with updating opinion 
through time, and the second, discussed in the next section, involves 
the use· of parametric models to assess probabilities for propositions 
that are not directly accessible to the evaluator's knowledge and. 
experience. 
Suppose the assessor believes that tomorrow he will observe a 
quantity X whose value is informative about another quantity, Y. In 
addition, he believes that nothing else he will learn in the interim 
should affect his opinions about Y, currently encoded in a probability 
distribution P. In this situation, he may choose to assess distri-
butions P(•IX=x) for each possible value of the quantity X. The 
purpose of these assessments is to discipline and direct his response 
to the actual value of X when he learns it tomorrow: P(•IX=x) 
represents an opinion about Y that he currently contracts to adopt 
tomorrow, should he observe x, and should his belief that he will 
learn nothing else relevant about Y tum out to be true. 
Why should he agree now to specify his future opinions? Because 
he knows how easy it is for the shock of the new to overwhelm pre-
viously accrued information bearing on Y, as encoded in P, and he 
believes that the distancing from that shock that he achieves through 
the prospective assessment, considering each candidate new observation 
in turn, can help him achieve a successful reconciliation between 
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old and new information. (~valuations of this sort can also help 
the assessor to decide whether it is worth observing X at all, in 
terms of its effects on his opinions about Y; but in this "design" 
context also, P(•(X=x} must be interpreted as a contract on a future 
opinion. In addition, these distributions, along with P, can also be 
assessed retrospectively, if the assessor wants to guard against 
overreacting to an observation he has just made. Carrying out such 
a retrospective analysis is a reasonable response when something 
other than X is learned in the interim, with X and that '.'something 
else" playing the role that X plays in the discussion here.) 
If we regard P(A(X=x) as a contract to adopt a particular opinion 
about the proposition A (~eferring to the value of Y)_ if and when X 
turns out to equal x, what should be the ·economic interpretation 
for this quantity? Today, before X is observed, the ticket priced 
at P(AIX=x) can be reserved with no cash payment (since the opinion 
it represents is not in force today); if it is reserved, and X=x 
tomorrow, the opinion is in effect and so the price must be turned 
over to the seller, in which case if A turns _out to be true, the 
seller must pay the buyer $1 and otherwise nothing; while if the 
ticket is reserved and X~x tomorrow, the reservation is cancelled 
and no money changes hands. That is: tickets are actually purchased 
only when the opinions they represent are in effect; an assessor 
willing to co.DDDit himself to an opinion in advance will accept 
reservations for the future purchase or sale of tickets at his pre-
specified price. I claim that this formulation captures in economic 
terms exactly what the assessor .meana when he evaluates P{AIX=x) 
prior to observing X. 
With this formulation, the Law of Total Probability must obtain. 
That is, suppose the assessor evaluates Pon f (.a se~ of propositions 
about -Y), and, for ·each possible value x for X, P(.• l X=x) on f. In 
the economic test for coherence, the bettor is allowed to buy a 
finite numher of tickets from the P-book; and, for each x, to contract 
for a finite number of tickets from the P(•IX=x)-book--these contracts 
become operative when and if xis observed. Because only one x can 
be observed, such a system of contracts, purchases and sales involves 
only a finite number of cash transactions. Unless the assessments 
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satisfy equation (.1) for some finitely additive distribution µ on 
the values of X and all propositions A inf, there exists a system 
of contracts, purchases and sales as described above that will 
guarantee the assessor a loss of at ·1east $c (for any prespecified 
amount c), no matter which xis observed or which of the propositions 
in Fare true. Thus, in this sequential learning context, assess-
ments that violate the Law of Total Probability are incoherent. This 
assertion is proved in Lane and Sudderth (1984) and Lane and Sudderth 
(1985). 
PUTATIVE PROBABILITIES AND STATISTICAL MODELS 
Suppose f is a set of observable propositions whose. probabilities 
must be evaluated for some inferential problem, but are difficult to 
evaluate directly. Suppose also that 0 is a set of propositions that 
the assessor believes· to be mu tally inconsistent and exhaustive, and 
for each e in 0 and A inf, P(Ale) is directly accessible to the 
assessor's knowledge and experience and so easy to assess. Suppose 
also that which 8 is true is unobservable, so the interpretation of 
.conditional probability as a contract discussed above could· not be 
1DBde operational (when would the money change hands?). Rather, 
P(AIS) has a :merely putative meaning: if the evaluator lived in a 
world in which e is true and is otherwise like his own, what would 
be his degree of belief in A? That is, while he is confused about 
the propositions in Fin the world he actually inhabits, the assessor 
can imagine how he would believe from the yantage points offered by 
the elements of e. 
Now suppose that the assessor also evaluates his probability 
distribution Pon the elements ·of F directly (difficult though this 
task may be). What relation need these evaluations bear to those 
conditional on the elements of~? Suppose a hettor is allowed to 
purchase or sell a finite number of P-priced tickets. Since the 
assessor is confident abDut his ability to evaluate probabilities 
for the elements of F from every 8-vantage point, and he believes 
that one of tliese vantage points giYes a view of toe world he actually 
inhabits., lie may evaluate the worth of the bet tor's transaction with 
him from each a-vantage point in turn. That is, if L represents his 
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loss from the transaction, he can evaluate with confidence E(Lle) for 
each e in 0. If each of these is greater than $c, then, whichever e, 
coupled with the rest of his general background information, actually 
describes the world in which the assessor lives, from the vantage 
point of that world the assessor faces a loss of at least $c. This 
anticipated loss represents an inconsistency between his direct 
assessment P and his assessments from the vantage points in 0. Lane 
and Sudderth (1984) prove that this anticipated loss can be avoided 
if and only if there is a finitely additive probability distribution 
µone such that P(A) c JP(Al8)dµ(8) for all A inf; that is, if the 
(difficult) unconditional assessment Pis linked to the (accessible) 
conditional assessments {P(•fe)} by the Law of Total Probability. 
This result responds to a question raised by Piccinato (1980). He 
asked ''How to deal with statistical models if we must get rid of 
conglomerability? Of course the ground for accepting or refusing con-
glomerability (or complete additivity) is a logical one, and must be 
independent from the mentioned question ••• For 'statistical model' 
I mean as usual a set of probability distributions on the space of 
possible outcomes, possibly indexed by·a parameter whose actual value 
is unknown ••• Can we live with nonconglomerability without giving up 
statistical models?" Of course, some statistical models have attri-
butes like the set 0 discussed above: the elements in the parameter 
space can be interpreted as propositions about the world, one of which 
the observer believes to be true, and it is possible to confidently 
assess putative probabilities for observables from the vantage point 
of each element of the model. When these conditions are satisfied, 
the logical ground that Piccanato seeks is the relevance of the eval-
uations of the anticipated loss from the vantage point of each para-
meter value as defined above; to avoid that loss, conglomerability 
must hold for the probabilities of obse·rvables with respect to their 
putative probabilities evaluated given parameter values. 
SOME OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS 
In the previous two sections, I have argued that in the situations 
in which conditional probabilities play a role in inference, as pro-
spective probabilities and putative probabilities, their evaluation 
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should respect the Law of Total Probability with respect to finitely 
additive distributionsµ. fllis point of view is criticized by Kadane, 
Schervish and Seidenfeld (1986), who take the position that " ••• the 
attempt to modulate nonconglomerability is misguided. If nonglomer-
ability is necessary for 'consistency', then nothing less than count-
ably additive distributions suffice with denumerable partitions, and 
even 'proper' priors may suffer nonconglomerability in non-denumerable 
partitions ••• " I disagree with their position for two reasons. First, 
I can think of no inferential problem in which it is reasonable to 
evaluate probabilities conditional on all possible events, and I 
believe that consistency tests should be applied only to the probab-
ilities that play a role in particular inferential problems. Secondly, 
I do not understand the relevance of the "called-off bet" economic 
formulation of conditional prob$bility, with purchase price handed 
over before the opinion represented by the conditional probability. 
is relevant. Rather, I believe that the actual role that conditional 
probabilities play in inference should be the basis of their economic 
interpretation, and I have attempted to isol$te two such roles and 
provide their respective· ·(and different) interpretations in the two 
previous sections. 
Several authors have objected to the criterion of anticipated loss 
as a condition for coherence developed in the previous section. I 
share this objection when it is applied to situations in which a sta-
tistical model has been adopted "for convenience", with no presumption 
that probabilities given 0 really describe the evaluator's putative 
beliefs in a world he believes might be his own and in which he can 
comfortably measure his uncertainty. In such cases, I cannot inter-
pret probabilities given 8 at all, much less decide how consistent 
they are with probabilities that actually do measure some of the 
evaluator's beliefs. But if putative probabilities are available as 
described in the previous section, then evaluating expectations from 
the same vantage point seems reasonable and meaningful; and if I face 
a $c loss in all possible worlds, then in particular I do in this one 
as well. (lt is important to realize that these expectations need 
bear no interpretation in terms of "repeated sampling", ~s Scozzafava 
(1984) seems to imply; they are just assessable previsions in an 
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